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Irreconcilable Differences: Conflicting Court
Approaches to Assessing the Duty to
Conciliate
Gregory Tsonist

INTRODUCTION

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
while exercising its duty to eliminate unlawful discriminatory
employment practices, must engage in voluntary settlements
with employers prior to bringing civil suits against them. This
duty to conciliate is the primary method by which the EEOC
effectuates its goals. While courts agree that the EEOC must
exercise its duty to conciliate, they agree on little else.
Circuit courts have long been divided as to how the EEOC's
conciliation efforts should be reviewed, but a recent Seventh
Circuit opinion' has significantly widened the split. For decades,
circuit courts agreed that conciliation required "good faith" on
the part of the EEOC. The split among these circuits centered on
what standard to use in assessing whether the EEOC acted with
"good faith" effort. The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth circuitS2 have
adopted an approach that is quite deferential to the EEOC and
does not inquire into the negotiations between the employer and
the EEOC. The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh circuitS3 have
adopted a three-part test that they use to assess the
t BA, The University of Chicago, 2005; JD Candidate, The University of Chicago
Law School, 2015.
1 See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F3d 171 (7th Cir 2013).

See generally Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v Radiator Specialty
Co, 610 F2d 178 (4th Cir 1979); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v KECO
Industries, 748 F2d 1097 (6th Cir 1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission U
2

Zia Co, 582 F2d 527 (10th Cir 1978).

See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Johnson & Higgins
Inc, 91 F3d 1529 (2d Cir 1996); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Klinger
Electric Co, 636 F2d 104 (5th Cir 1981); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission U
Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 340 F3d 1256 (11th Cir 2003).
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reasonableness of the EEOC's conciliation efforts. In 2013, the
Seventh Circuit widened the circuit split, holding that the
EEOC's conciliation efforts were not subject to a "good faith"
standard and were not judicially reviewable at all.4 This
groundbreaking decision widened the divide amongst the
Circuits and, with seven Circuits now divided between three
approaches, increased the need for the United States Supreme
Court to resolve the issue.5
This Comment argues that conciliation efforts should be
subject to judicial review and that the three-part reasonableness
test is superior to the deferential standard. Part I of this
Comment examines the EEOC's inception, statutory mandate to
eliminate discrimination, and court interpretations of the
EEOC's duty to conciliate. The arguments presented in the
Seventh Circuit's Mach Mining decision are comprehensively
analyzed in Part II. Finally, Part III examines "good faith" in
the collective bargaining context to advocate for the adoption of
the reasonableness test. By drawing a comparison to collective
bargaining,
this
Comment
demonstrates
that
the
reasonableness standard creates the correct incentives for the
EEOC to reach voluntary agreements, promotes information
sharing between the employer and EEOC, and maximizes the
potential for successful conciliation agreements. For these
reasons, the reasonableness test better effectuates the primary
method that the EEOC uses to eliminate discriminationvoluntary compliance.
I. THE DUTY TO CONCILIATE
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646
"to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion, or national origin."7 To help achieve this
end, Congress created the EEOC to enforce Title VII by

4

Mach Mining, 738 F3d at 172-73.

' A resolution to this issue may arrive shortly. The Supreme Court granted a
petition for writ of certiorari in the Mach Mining case on June 30, 2014. Mach Mining,

LLC u Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 134 S Ct 2872 (2014).
6 42 USC § 2000(e).
HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 1st Sess, 26 (1963). See also 110 Cong Rec 1307913080 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
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preventing and resolving discriminatory employment practices.8
Presently, the EEOC enforces several federal statutes that
address discrimination by employers, unions, or government
agencies. 9
As originally enacted under Title VII, the EEOC lacked the
key enforcement mechanism that it has today-the federal
courts. Initially, Title VII only empowered the EEOC to work
with employers to voluntarily cure discriminatory practices.10
This system proved largely ineffective, as the EEOC reached
voluntary agreements in fewer than half of its cases." Congress
then passed the Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972,
which gave the EEOC the authority to enforce Title VII through
litigation. 12
The power to ultimately institute civil actions did not
eliminate the focus on voluntary compliance for either Title VII
or the EEOC. Instead, the 1972 amendments to Title VII
provided an "integrated, multistep enforcement procedure
culminating in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil action in a
federal court." 13
Under this framework, a complainant files a charge with
the EEOC alleging a discriminatory, unlawful employment
practice.14 The EEOC must notify the employer of the charge
within ten days. 15 The EEOC then investigates the charge and

8

See 42 USC

§ 2000(e)-5.

9 The EEOC also enforces the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act of

1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Sections 501 and 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Laws Enforced by the EEOC,
online at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes (visited Oct 18, 2014).
10 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Alexander v Gardner Denver Co,
415 US 36, 44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the
preferred means for eliminating discriminatory practices.").
" See H Rep No 92-238, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 2139-40 (1971) ("Of the 35,445 charges
that were recommended for investigation [since the formation of the EEOC], [evidence of
discrimination] was found in over 63% of the cases, but in less than half of these cases
was the Commission able to achieve a totally or even partially successful conciliation.").
While no measure of success existed, it seems plain that Congress found the EEOC's
results insufficient enough to substantially increase enforcement powers.
12 42 USC § 2000e-5(f).
1s
Occidental Life Insurance Company of California v Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 432 US 355, 359 (1977).
14 Id ("That procedure begins when a charge is filed with
the EEOC alleging that an

employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.").
1"
42 USC § 2000e-5(b).
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determines if there is reasonable cause to believe it is true. 16 If
there is reasonable cause, the EEOC "shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."1 7
Generally, the employer is provided with written notice
commencing the conciliation process-commonly referred to as a
Conciliation Notice-with the ultimate goal of reducing a
voluntary agreement to a signed writing. 18 If the EEOC fails to
reach a satisfactory agreement with the employer and
terminates the conciliation process, the EEOC will send the
employer a notice that further attempts at conciliation "would be
futile or nonproductive." 19 At any time after thirty days from
when the charge was filed, if the EEOC is "unable to secure from
the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
[EEOC], [it] may bring a civil action." 2 0
Prior to a Seventh Circuit ruling in December 2013, courts
had uniformly stated that the EEOC must act in good faith. 21
For decades, the predominant issue that divided federal circuits
was the standard by which to evaluate the EEOC's good faith
effort. 22 Some circuits require that the EEOC's conciliation
efforts be reasonable. 2 3 Others differ markedly and afford more
deference to the EEOC's actions during the conciliation
process. 24 The Seventh Circuit recently held that conciliation is
solely under the EEOC's authority and not subject to judicial
review. 25 Finally, in circuits that have not definitively addressed

1
17
1s
19
20
21

OccidentalLife, 432 US at 359.
42 USC § 2000e-5(b).
See 29 CFR § 1601.24. This is commonly referred to as a Conciliation Notice.
29 CFR § 1601.25. This is commonly called a Failure to Conciliate Notice.
42 USC s 2000e-5(f)(1).

See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u KECO Industries, 748 F2d

1097, 1102 (6th Cir 1984) (stating that the EEOC "must make a good faith effort to

conciliate"); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Zia Co, 582 F2d 527, 533
(10th Cir 1978); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Radiator Specialty Co,
610 F2d 178, 183 (4th Cir 1979).
22 There is a
split as to whether the EEOC's pre-suit statutory duties are
"jurisdictional prerequisites" or "conditions precedent." See, for example, Zia, 582 F2d at
532-33 (describing the various approaches courts use). While that distinction may have
an effect on a case's ultimate disposition, it is irrelevant to this Comment's conciliation
discussion.
23

See, for example, Klinger Electric, 636 F2d at 107.

24

See, for example, KECO Industries, 748 F2d at 1102.
Mach Mining, 738 F3d at 172-73.

21
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the issue, district courts have taken a variety of approaches in
analyzing the EEOC's duty to conciliate. 26
A. The Reasonableness Test
The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a
three-part standard with which to review EEOC conciliation
attempts (referred to here as the "reasonableness test"). 27 This
standard is not satisfied by merely any attempt to conciliate.
The reasonableness test's goal is to facilitate meaningful
conciliation between both parties and protect against "take-it-orleave-it" demands by the EEOC. 2 8
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Klinger
Electric Co, 2 9 the Fifth Circuit rejected the rationale that any
good faith attempt would satisfy the EEOC's statutory duty to
conciliate. After the EEOC found evidence of employment
discrimination, it mailed a Conciliation Notice to Klinger with a
request for information, Klinger signed and returned the
proposed conciliation agreement and information to the EEOC.30
Finding the agreement unacceptable in light of the new figures,
the EEOC revised and sent an updated Conciliation Notice to
Klinger. 31 Klinger did not respond to the proposal, and the
EEOC shortly thereafter filed suit. 32 The district court dismissed
the case relying, in part, on the EEOC's failure to adequately
conciliate in light of the agreement Klinger had previously
signed. 33 While the Fifth Circuit noted that it was appropriate
for the district court to inquire into the sufficiency of the EEOC's
conciliation attempts, it reversed the district court and outlined
specific steps the EEOC must take to satisfy its statutory duty

See, for example, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v California
Psychiatric Transitions, Inc, 725 F Supp 1100, 1114-15 (ED Cal 2010) (combining the
deferential standard and reasonableness test while assessing the EEOC's attempts at
conciliation).
27 See generally Johnson & Higgins, 91 F3d 1529; Klinger Electric, 636 F2d 104;
Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 340 F3d 1256.
28 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Agro Distribution,LLC, 555 F3d
462, 468 (5th Cir 2009).
29 636 F2d 104 (5th Cir 1981).
26

so Id at 106.
s1 Id.
32 Id.
" Klinger Electric, 636 F2d at 106-07.
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to conciliate before filing suit. 34 The "fundamental question,"
and
according to the court, "is the reasonableness
responsiveness of the EEOC's conduct under all the
circumstances." 35 According to the court, EEOC successfully
satisfies its statutory burden to attempt conciliation when it (1)
"outlines to the employer the reasonable cause for [the EEOC's]
belief that Title VII has been violated," (2) "offers an opportunity
for voluntary compliance," and (3) "responds in a reasonable and
flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer." 36
The Eleventh Circuit endorsed this approach when it found

bad faith in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 37 An Asplundh employee filed a
charge of racial discrimination after an incident with an
employee of another company that worked on the same job
site. 38 The third-party employee told "offensive racial jokes" and
allegedly displayed a noose made from rope. 39 The EEOC's
investigation also included "disparate pay, racial harassment,
and retaliation." 40 Thirty-two months after the investigation
began, the EEOC sent a reasonable cause determination and,
one week later, a proposed conciliation agreement to the
employer.4 1 The conciliation agreement provided twelve business
days for a response, and upon the employer's retention of local
counsel and request for an extension, the EEOC sent a letter
concluding that conciliation attempts had failed. 42 The Eleventh
Circuit cited the three-part test outlined in Klinger Electric and
upheld the district court's ruling that the "grossly arbitrary
manner" of attempted conciliation and the "unreasonable
conduct" of the EEOC justified a finding of bad faith. 43 The court
found that the limited time to consider the proposal and the
refusal to extend it, in light of the length of the investigation,

34

Id.

"

Id at 107.
Id, citing Marshall v Sun Oil Company (Delaware), 605 F2d 1331, 1335-39 (5th
Cir 1979).
1
340 F3d 1256 (11th Cir 2003).
1

'8 Id at 1257.

39 Id.
40 Id at 1257-58.
41

Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 340 F3d at 1258.

42

Id at 1258-59.

43

Id at 1259.
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deprived Asplundh of a "meaningful conciliation opportunity."4 4
Importantly, the court discussed that the proposed conciliation
agreement contained "no theory of liability ... demanded a
remedy ... national in scope, and [was, in part] ... impossible to

perform."4 5 In light of these factors, "such an 'all or nothing'
approach on the part of a government agency, one of whose most
essential functions is to attempt conciliation with the private
party, will not do." 4 6
The Second Circuit has also explicitly adopted the
reasonableness test in assessing the EEOC's statutory duty to

conciliate. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v
Johnson & Higgins Inc,4 7 the court used the three-part test
outlined in Klinger Electric to assess a claim of age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).4 8 The court reasoned that the employer
fundamentally disagreed that its practices were unlawful and
noted the employer refused to supply information to the EEOC
to calculate damages.4 9 As such, the court held that the EEOC's
conciliation attempts were reasonable and in good faith. SO
B.

The Deferential Standard

The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits evaluate conciliation
through an approach that is more deferential to the EEOC
(referred to as the "deferential standard"). 51 Using this
standard, a court largely looks at whether the EEOC attempted
conciliation but largely does not consider the quality of the offer
or the process. Under this standard, any good faith attempt at
conciliation by the EEOC satisfies its statutory obligation to
conciliate.
The Fourth Circuit describes the statutory duty to conciliate
in minimal terms. In one case, an employer charged with

Id at 1260-61.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 340 F3d at 1260.
46 Id, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a Pet Inc, Funsten Nut
Division, 612 F2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir 1980).
47
91 F3d 1529 (2d Cir 1996).
48 Id at 1533.
49 Id at 1535.
5o Id.
44
4'

5'
See generally Radiator Specialty Co, 610 F2d 178; KECO Industries, 748 F2d
1097; Zia, 582 F2d 527.
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discrimination under Title VII for its hiring and promotion
policies of minority employees challenged the sufficiency of the
EEOC's conciliation efforts. 52 During the investigation of the
claim, the EEOC toured the employer's plant and suggested a
meeting to discuss a settlement agreement. 53 The employer
declined, and shortly afterwards the EEOC relayed that the
refusal to meet would result in a failure to conciliate.54 The court
held that the EEOC gave the employer "several opportunities to
participate in conciliation discussions," but the court's holding
did not rest solely on the level of effort expended by the EEOC.55
Recognizing the importance of conciliation, the court explained
that "[a]ttempted conciliation is a condition of the Commission's
power to sue."5 6 The court explained that "the law requires no
more than a good faith attempt at conciliation," and concluded
that the EEOC "made such an attempt."5 7
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v KECO
Industries,5 8 the Sixth Circuit considered whether the EEOC
had satisfied its duty to conciliate in a class-action sex
discrimination claim.5 9 The EEOC brought suit under Title VII
alleging discrimination
against female employees by
"maintaining sex segregated job classifications, paying women
lower wages than men, assigning women to lower paid clerical
positions, and refusing to promote them."60 The district court
dismissed the suit in part because the EEOC had not conducted
"meaningful conciliation." 61 The Sixth Circuit reversed on the
grounds that the employer had indicated that it did not wish to
settle the suit and thus the EEOC had conciliated in good
faith. 62 Noting that employer dissatisfaction with the attempted
conciliation is an inappropriate basis for reviewing the statutory
12

Radiator Specialty Co, 610 F2d at 181.

"

Id at 183.
Id.

54
5

5

Id.

Radiator Specialty Co, 610 F2d at 181.

SId.
"' 748 F2d 1097 (6th Cir 1984).
'9 Id at 1098.
6o Id.
61
Id at 1099.
62 KECO Industries, 748 F2d at 1101 ("[T]he EEOC sought to
conciliate the classbased claim with KECO on a good faith basis. Conciliation efforts broke down only after
KECO rejected the EEOC's overtures.").
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duty to conciliate, the court concluded that the proper standard
is whether "the EEOC made an attempt at conciliation." 63 In so
holding, the court explicitly stated that the "form and substance
of those conciliations is within the discretion of the EEOC
and is beyond judicial review." 6 4
The Tenth Circuit has not explicitly endorsed the Sixth
Circuit's approach, but it is clear that it employs a similar
deferential standard.6 5 In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v Zia Co, 66 the court stated, in considering
conciliation attempts made by the EEOC under the ADEA, that
"a court should not examine the details of the offers and
counteroffers between the parties, nor impose its notions of what
the agreement should provide." 67 The court elaborated in a
subsequent case that "[b]ecause conciliation involves at least
two parties, we must evaluate one party's efforts with an eye to
the conduct of the other party."68 Noting that conciliation is "a
flexible and responsive process which necessarily differs from
case to case," the court held that only a "sincere and reasonable
effort to negotiate by providing the defendant 'an adequate
opportunity to respond to all charges and negotiate possible
settlements' was necessary." 69 It is important to note that under
the court's interpretation, the EEOC's "reasonable effort" seems
to mandate only that the opportunity for settlement must be
present after the employer understands what charges it faces.

6

KECO Industries, 748 F2d at 1102.

64

Id.

6

See Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission u California Teachers

Association, 534 F Supp 209, 212 (ND Cal 1982) (outlining the two basic good faith
approaches and citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Zia for the deferential approach);

see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Hometown Buffet, Inc, 481 F
Supp 2d 1110, 1113 (SD Cal 2007) ("The other view, expressed by the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, instructs that the district court should not consider the details of the parties'
negotiations, but rather should focus on whether the EEOC provided the employer an
opportunity to confront all the issues.").
66
582 F2d 527 (10th Cir 1978).
67 Id at
533.

6" Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u PrudentialFederal Savings and
Loan Association, 763 F2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir 1985), quoting Marshall v Sun Oil
Co, 605 F2d 1331, 1335 (5th Cir 1979).
69

Prudential Federal Savings and Loan, 763 F2d at 1169, quoting Marshall v

HartfordFire Insurance Co, 78 FRD 97, 107 (DC Conn 1978).

674
C.
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Circuits in Which the Conciliation Standard is an Open
Question

Some Circuit Courts of Appeals have not definitively ruled
on the issue of good faith conciliation. District court decisions
within one circuit have generally trended toward the deferential
approach. In another circuit, interpretation of an analogous
state statute provided dicta in support of the deferential
approach as well.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not weighed in on
the appropriate standard for reviewing the EEOC's conciliation
efforts. Though district courts under its jurisdiction continue to
confront the issue and generally apply the deferential standard,
some district courts have applied a hybrid standard that
combines the deferential standard and the reasonableness test.70
In one exemplary case applying the deferential approach, the
EEOC informed an employer that it has reasonable cause to
believe that at least two employees were subjected to sexual
harassment and sex-based discrimination. 71 The EEOC's only
attempt at conciliation included a demand for the maximum
statutory fine of $300,000 per employee and back pay. 7 2 While
the court stated that the evidence provided to the employer was
"conclusory and unidentified" and that the EEOC's "rigid and
preemptive attitude .

.

. did not serve as an effective conciliation

technique,"73 it nonetheless found that the EEOC afforded an
opportunity for the employer to "confront the issues" and quoted
the Sixth Circuit's decision in KECO Industries in holding that
the "EEOC minimally complied with its conciliation
obligations."7 4

70 Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Alia
Corporation,842 F
Supp 2d 1243, 1256 (ED Cal 2012) (stating that there was "no reason to depart from the
deferential approach taken by the district courts in the Ninth Circuit," the court only
assessed whether an attempt at conciliation was made), with Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission u California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc, 725 F Supp 1100,
1114-15 (ED Cal 2010) ("[T]he law requires no more than a good faith attempt at
conciliation by the EEOC; in doing so, the EEOC must outline the basis for its
determination of discrimination, offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance, and
respond flexibly to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.").
71 Hometown Buffet, 481 F Supp 2d at 1111.
72 Id at 1111-12.
7
74

Id at 1114-15.
Id at 1115.
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Similarly to the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit has not
decided on which standard to utilize when assessing EEOC
conciliation. A recent district court ruling analyzed the circuit
split while assessing a Maine statute with a conciliation
provision analogous to that of Title VII. 75 Comparing the
reasonableness test with the deferential approach, the court
approvingly characterized the deferential standard as "less
interventional" and stated that it "seems wise."76
D.

The Seventh Circuit: A New Approach

A recent, landmark decision in the Seventh Circuit adopted
a third approach in the already existing circuit split on the issue
of EEOC conciliation. In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v Mach Mining, LLC,7 7 the EEOC filed suit against
an employer for alleged sex discrimination against a class of
female applicants for coal mining jobs. 78 After the employer
challenged whether the EEOC engaged in good faith
conciliation, the EEOC filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that the sufficiency of conciliation could be determined
from the face of the complaint.7 9 The motion was denied, but the
district court certified the motion for interlocutory appeal as to
"whether an alleged failure-to-conciliate is subject to judicial
review in the form of an implied affirmative defense."8 0 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that "[t]he
language of the statute, the lack of a meaningful standard for
courts to apply, and the overall statutory scheme convince us
that an alleged failure-to-conciliate is not an affirmative defense
to the merits of a discrimination suit."8 1 In other words, the
court stated that no standard of review is appropriate because
employers cannot challenge the sufficiency of EEOC conciliation
attempts. The
court
acknowledged
that its opinion
"complicate[s] a circuit split more than it creates one" because it

7
Maine Human Rights Commission u Sunbury Primary Care, Pennsylvania, 770 F
Supp 2d 370, 404 (D Ma 2011).
7
Id at 405.
7
738 F3d 171 (7th Cir 2013).
78 Id at 173.
79 Id at 172.
80 Id.

81 Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 172.
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creates a third prong in an already existing circuit split.82 Due to
the Mach Mining, LLC opinion's first-in-kind nature, its relative
youth, and the fact that it is irreconcilable with all other court
opinions that have addressed the issue, this Comment will
analyze it in great detail. 83
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO CONCILIATION
The Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC's conciliation
process is not subject to judicial review for three reasons.84 First,
the text of the statute implies deference to the EEOC, not an
affirmative defense for failure-to-conciliate. 85 Second, a failureto-conciliate defense requires a meaningful standard for review,
which does not exist. 86 Third, judicial review of conciliation
undermines the statutory goal of Title VII by inhibiting effective
conciliation. 8 7 This Comment contends that each of these
arguments is either incorrect or better supports the application
of a good faith standard of review.
A.

The Statutory Text Argument

One critical consideration is whether the statute, as written,
imposes a good faith obligation on the EEOC or subjects
conciliation efforts to judicial review. As is often the case, the
court began its analysis with the text of the statute. The statute
at issue states, "If the Commission determines after such
investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods

82

Id at 182.

"' While the decision was from a panel of the court, the opinion was "circulated
among all judges of [the] court in regular active service . . . [and] [n]o judge favored a
rehearing en banc on the question of rejecting the implied affirmative defense for failureto-conciliate." Id at 182 n 3.
84 Id at 172, 174. The court's opinion listed five total considerations to its holding.
The fourth consideration was that its decision conformed with previous Seventh Circuit
precedent. Since the Seventh Circuit had not previously addressed the issue, and due to
this Comment's examination of the issue on a national level, the Seventh Circuit's
precedent is not particularly relevant. The fifth consideration was a rejection of the
rationales used by all other circuits for the previous reasons the decision listed.
"' Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 174-75.
"1 Id at 175-78.
87 Id at 178-80.
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of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."8 8 The EEOC cannot
sue until it "has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission."89 The
court analyzed the phrases "endeavor to eliminate," "informal
methods," and "acceptable to the Commission" and concluded
that Congress's intent was to defer to the EEOC's decisionmaking, and not courts', for the entire process. This conclusion is
supplemented by a correlative provision relating to conciliation
confidentiality:
Nothing said or done during and as a part of such
informal endeavors may be made public by the
Commission, its officers or employees, or used as
evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written
consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes
public information in violation of this subsection shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.9 0
Concluding that the judicial review is inapposite with the
confidentiality of conciliation, the court considered it is best to
"avoid the conflict, stick to the text, and reject both the nonstatutory affirmative defense and the non-statutory exceptions
to confidentiality."91

While straightforward, the statutory arguments presented
by the court are incomplete. Clearly the statute does not contain
an express statement of a "good faith" standard. However the
court's attention to the words "endeavor to eliminate" ignore the
key word that precedes them: "shall."92 By using the word
"shall," the statute creates a duty to pursue conciliation. As the
Tenth Circuit explained, "[t]he law declares that the
Commission 'shall' seek conciliation; it is inconceivable to us
that good faith efforts are not required." 93 All courts confronted
with the issue of the EEOC's conciliation attempts have, either
explicitly or implicitly, applied a good faith standard. While the
Seventh Circuit would rely on Congressional oversight or

89
90

91
92

93

42 USC § 2000e-5(b).
42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).
42 USC § 2000e-b(5).
Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 175.
Id at 174.
Zia, 582 F2d at 527.
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presidential appointments to cure issues with conciliation,9 4
these tools are simply not practical or effective ways to resolve
issues arising out of conciliation on a case-by-case basis. To put
it another way, the mandate is meaningless if there is no way
for it to be enforced; this construction of the statute should be
avoided.
The legislative history of Title VII, while limited in
applicability to this issue, supports such a reading. In an earlier
Senate version of Title VII's 1972 amendments, the text
included
a specific provision concerning the judicial
reviewability of EEOC reasonable cause determinations. The
initial provision read as follows:
If the Commission determines after attempting to secure
voluntary compliance under subsection (b) that it is
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission and to the

person aggrieved, which determination shall not be
reviewable in any court, the Commission shall issue and
cause to be served upon the respondent a complaint
95

The phrase concerning judicial review was ultimately
removed and did not make it into the final version of the law.
This suggests that Congress deliberated as to whether to remove
some or all of the EEOC's pre-suit obligations from judicial
review and ultimately chose not to. 96 Additionally, Congress has
passed several statutes since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
that mirror the conciliation provision passed in Title VII. 97 If

94 Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 180 ("Congress can exert its influence on the
EEOC through oversight hearings, adjustments to appropriations, and statutory
amendments. In addition, the commissioners who head the agency are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.").
95 117 Cong Rec 31712 (1971) (emphasis added).
96 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845 (1992) (arguing that legislative history, including drafts of
legislation, can provide useful insight into Congressional intent). Even advocates of
adhering to statutory text have utilized the drafting history of legislation to support
arguments. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Waffle House, Inc, 534
US 279, 302-03 (2002) (utilizing the legislative history of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, and specifically the language changed in the draft bills, to
conclude that Congress intended discretion for remedies in discrimination cases to
remain with courts) (Thomas dissenting).
97 See, for example, the statutes cited in note 9.
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Congress intended for the statutory scheme of Title VII to
preclude judicial review of conciliation, they had ample time and
opportunity to clarify.
Lastly, the court acknowledges that two potential solutions
exist regarding the confidentiality provision. First, parties can
potentially file information from conciliation settlements under
seal to prevent the information from being "public." 9 8 While case
law is "inconsistent" on the applicability of this provision, it
exists as a potential solution that would prevent judicial review
from violating the statute.9 9 Second, if an interpretation of the
statute includes judicial review, a contingent exception to the
confidentiality provision similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
408(b) could also apply. 100 In either scenario, the existence of the
confidentiality provision simply requires an implicit exception
that would be contingent on an implicit standard of review.
B.

The Standard of Review Argument

The court's second rationale for limiting a failure-toconciliate defense was "the lack of a meaningful standard of
review to apply."10 1 While the court acknowledged that there is a
basic presumption of judicial review that is "central to American
law," it concluded that "Congress's failure to provide even the
outlines of such a standard tends to show that it did not intend
for judicial review of conciliation through an implied affirmative

defense." 102
Without specific statutory instructions, other circuits have
applied a good faith requirement that, at least in theory,
analyzes the process that the EEOC went through during
conciliation and not the substance of its proposals. 103 This
standard is similar to the explicit good faith requirement in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).104 The Mach Mining,
LLC court ultimately considered this an inappropriate standard
in part because "the distinction between process and substance
§ 2000e-b(5).

98

42 USC

99

Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 175.

100 Id. Rule 408(b) involves the use of settlement negotiations as evidence in a
collateral proceeding. Id.

101 Id.
102

Id at 177-78.

'os Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 176-77. See also Zia, 582 F2d at 533.
104 Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F3d at 177.
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in this context is unlikely to survive the adversarial crucible of
litigation."10 5 Any court would "inevitably find itself engaged in
a prohibited inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of
particular offers . . . unless its review were so cursory as to be

meaningless."1 06 However by examining the approach taken by
other courts, a workable good faith standard emerges that
focuses on the process undertaken during conciliation.
Undoubtedly there are instances in which courts have
inappropriately delved into the substance of EEOC proposals to
evaluate good faith. Yet this fact does not make the good faith
standard entirely unworkable. A court's failure to restrict its
analysis to process is no doubt problematic. Overreach on the
part of some courts only evinces the need for clear, process-based
inquiries for a court to use when applying a good faith standard.
Confusion by some courts does not prove that process-described
at times as the form of negotiations-is inextricably intertwined
with substance. One early Fifth Circuit case dealing with
conciliation explained what a process-oriented examination
entails and demonstrates that a good faith framework, when
properly applied, can exclude substance-based inquiries.
1 07
In Marshall v Sun Oil Co (Delaware),
the court explained

its three-step process to evaluate the process of conciliation.
First, the court should examine "what the [EEOC] did."108 This
would generally include outlining the reason the EEOC believes
Title VII has been violated and offering an opportunity for
voluntary
compliance-the
first two
prongs
of the
reasonableness test. Second, the court would examine how the
employer responded. 109 This examination would include
assessing whether the employer "attempt[ed] to challenge or
rebut the evidence" and whether the employer was either
passive" or "intransigent." 110 Third, the court would assess how
the EEOC "respond[ed] to the action or inaction" of the employer
and whether the EEOC "seize[d] the opportunity to go forward"
or "refuse[d] to address counter-evidence."11 1 This framework,

1o5 Id.
106 Id.
107

605 F2d 1331 (5th Cir 1979).

Sun Oil, 605 F2d at 1335.
Id at 1335-36.
110 Id at 1336.
111 Id.
1os

109
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when properly applied, avoids examining substance-whether
the EEOC should have accepted a settlement offer or whether
the EEOC demanded too much, for example. It is simply an
analysis of the conduct of both parties and whether they "act in
a reasonable and responsive manner." 112 Sun Oil demonstrates
that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's belief, process-based
inquiries into good faith can be both workable and meaningful.
C.

The Effect of Judicial Review on Title VII's Policy Goals

The Seventh Circuit's third reason for concluding in Mach
Mining, LLC that the EEOC conciliation process is not subject to
judicial review was that a failure-to-conciliate defense "does not
fit well with the broader statutory scheme" and undermines
Title VII's goal of voluntary compliance. 1 13 Essentially, the court
concluded that allowing employers to challenge the sufficiency of
the EEOC's conciliation attempts would reduce the number of
voluntary agreements reached.114 To reach this conclusion, the
court analyzed the incentives for both employers and the EEOC
to reach an agreement when an affirmative defense exists. For
employers, the court reasoned that allowing such a defense
would transform the conciliation process into a potent weapon to
seek dismissal after the EEOC files suit. 115 According to the
court, employers face low costs and large potential benefits in
attempting to gain dismissal through failure-to-conciliate
defenses.116 With regard to the EEOC, the court found that the
prospects of the EEOC "abandon[ing] conciliation altogether or
misus[ing] it by advancing unrealistic and even extortionate
settlement demands" to be "[im]plausible."1 17
The court is correct that employers, since the 1972
amendments that gave the EEOC access to federal courts,
litigate failure-to-conciliate claims. But lack of judicial review
presents two problems. First, these insufficiently conciliated
claims would proceed to discovery, without challenge, if courts
cannot
assess conciliation
efforts.
Modern
estimates

Sun Oil, 605 F2d at 1336.
..
s Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 178.
112

114

See id at 179.

l..

Id at 178.

116 Id at 179.
117 Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F3d at 179.
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demonstrate that discovery costs, on average, account for half of
total litigation costs in any given case. 118 Discovery is the single
most costly part of a lawsuit and should not be viewed as a de
minimis cost even when compared to potential dismissal. 119
Secondly, when courts do find insufficient conciliation attempts,
the usual consequence is a stay in proceedings to allow for the
appropriate conciliation to take place. 120 Dismissal is an
uncommon remedy.121 As such, the Seventh Circuit's contention
that, for an employer, the "potential gains of escaping liability"
far exceed the "risks of not engaging in serious attempts at
conciliation" seems flawed. 122 Judicial review resulting in a stay
of proceedings to resume conciliation-or a dismissal in cases of
extreme dereliction of the duty to conciliate-would reduce costs
and reduce the incentive for employers to leverage the
conciliation process solely as a potential defense.
Additionally, the court provides no evidence that either good
faith standard-the deferential standard or reasonableness
test-has substantially burdened the EEOC's conciliation
process. While the court uses EEOC statistics to show how
important conciliation is to the EEOC and how few cases are
litigated, 123 it neglects to acknowledge that those statistics are
the result of over forty years of judicial review assessing EEOC
conciliation attempts. The good faith standards used by courts to
this point provide the backdrop to the successful conciliations
reached by the EEOC. A more detailed analysis of incentives in
the conciliation process is presented in Section III.
Finally, the court considered the potential for mistakes,
abuse or misconduct by the EEOC. 124 Anecdotal case evidence
11
John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need For Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L J 547, 547 (2010).
119 Id at 549-50.
120 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u New
Cherokee Corp, 829 F Supp
73, 81 (SDNY 1993) ("Even if the EEOC is found not to have fulfilled its statutory duty
to conciliate, the preferred remedy is not dismissal but instead a stay of the action to
permit such conciliation. Where the EEOC has made absolutely no efforts dismissal is
appropriate.").
121 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Bloomberg LP, 751 F Supp 2d
628, 643 (SDNY 2010) ("Ordinarily, when the EEOC has failed to meet its duty to
conciliate, the preferred remedy is not dismissal but instead a stay of the action to
permit such conciliation.") (internal quotations omitted).
122 Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 179.
123 Id ("In fiscal year 2012, the agency attempted
conciliation in 4207 cases, was
unsuccessful in 2616, yet filed suit on the merits in just 122.").
124 Id at 179-80.
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demonstrates that the EEOC has indeed engaged in these
tactics. During conciliation the EEOC has, for example, required
remedies that are impossible to perform,1 25 requested tens of
millions of dollars in settlement without providing information
as to class size or damage calculations, 12 6 and demanded large
payouts to satisfy "outside groups." 127 This is not meant to
suggest that these cases typify the EEOC's attempts at
conciliation. However the EEOC's conciliation tactics sometimes
employ these forms and are exactly the reason that judicial
review and a good faith standard are necessary. While heavyhanded tactics or abuse are not "plausible" to the court, 128 they
have happened. A good faith standard of review would provide a
judicial check on the EEOC during the conciliation process.
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD

Comparing the various options employed by courtsdeferential approach, the reasonableness approach, and the lack
of judicial review-the reasonableness standard is best suited to
effectuate the goals of the EEOC and federal discrimination
statutes. Section II provided an in-depth analysis and argument
in support of the validity of judicial review and correlative
failure-to-conciliate
defense. This section contrasts the
reasonableness test with the deferential approach to determine
which standard is best suited to gauge "good faith" conciliation.
It is undisputed that the EEOC's purpose is to prevent and
resolve discriminatory employment practices primarily through
voluntary means. The reasonableness test is better than the
deferential standard because it provides the right incentives
during settlement discussions and maximizes the potential for
information sharing. By analyzing the duty to collectively
bargain and comparing it to the duty to conciliate, this
Comment will argue that the reasonableness test is superior in
effectuating the policy goals of the EEOC.
Comparison between the duty to conciliate and the duty to
collectively bargain is appropriate for multiple reasons. The
121
126

127

See Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 340 F3d at 1260.
See Bloomberg LP, 751 F Supp 2d 628, 632 (SDNY 2010).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Sears, Roebuck & Co, 839 F2d

302, 358 (7th Cir 1988) (stating that as a result, the EEOC had "badly abused" the
conciliation process).
128 Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F3d at 179.
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collective bargaining process, like conciliation, is an adversarial
process between an employer and another party. The NLRA
largely governs labor law in the United States. 129 While the
employer faces a private party-the union-in collective
bargaining and the government in conciliation, the incentives
present in the adversarial proceedings of conciliation and
collective bargaining are closely analogous. Secondly, courts
have also compared the two processes. In Zia, the court
explained that "a court should not examine the details of the
offers and counteroffers between the parties, nor impose its
notions of what the agreement should provide, any more than it
would if dealing with labor contract negotiations under the
Labor Management Relations Act." 130 Other courts have also
compared Title VII and the NLRA in various contexts. 131 Similar
statutory mandates are yet a third reason to compare collective
bargaining with conciliation. Title VII mandates that the EEOC
attempt conciliation, but does not require the Commission to
come to an agreement with an employer. 132 Likewise, the NLRA
only mandates that employers and representative unions meet
and collectively bargain, however no proposal must be agreed to
nor must any concessions be made. 133 Lastly, the public policy
underlying both collective bargaining and conciliation is a
primarily voluntary enforcement mechanism.134 Since the
common focus is on voluntary agreements between parties, the
incentives and obstacles to reaching these agreements are
similar in important ways.

129 Wagner Act, Pub L No 74-198, ch 372, 49 Stat 449
(1935), codified at 29 USC
151-69 (2006).
s Zia, 582 F2d at 533. The Seventh Circuit's decision also compared a potential
implicit "good faith" standard in conciliation to the NLRA's "good faith" standard. Mach
Mining, LLC, 738 F3d at 176.
.s. See, for example, Doe u Oberweis Dairy, 456 F3d 704, 711 (7th Cir 2006)
(comparing a "good faith" standard of exhaustion under Title VII to "good faith" under
the National Labor Relations Act).
132 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).

§§

.ss 29 USC § 158(d).
134 Compare Alexander u Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36, 44 (1974)
(explaining that
voluntary agreements are the primary way to address discriminatory practices under
Title VII), with National Labor Relations Board v American National Insurance Co, 343
US 395, 401-02 (1952) ("The National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote
industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements governing relations
between unions and employers.").
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The Duty to Collectively Bargain

A.

The NLRA provides rights for employees to organize and
collectively bargain with their employer. Section 8(a)(5) imposes
a statutory duty on employers to collectively bargain with the
representing union. 135 An analogous provision creates the same
duty for the union to collectively bargain with an employer. 136
Failure to bargain collectively is an unfair labor practice and a
grievance can be filed with the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"), the administrative agency charged with executing the

NLRA. 13 7
Soon after the NLRA's passage and implementation,
Congress sought to clarify the duty to bargain. The Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) 138 was passed in 1947 and,
among other changes, added Section 8(d) to the NLRA. 139
Section 8(d) explains that the duty to collectively bargain
consists of "[meeting] at reasonable times and [conferring] in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment

. . . but such obligation does not

compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession." 14 0 The categories of "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" are known as mandatory
subjects of bargaining; the refusal to bargain on these topics is
an unfair labor practice. 141 Other topics are considered
permissive and, generally speaking, will not result in unfair
labor practice charges if not negotiated over. 142
Employers and unions must bargain over mandatory
subjects, but they often do not reach agreements on these
subjects. Thus the duty to bargain over a mandatory subject
extends until impasse has been reached. 143 Impasse has no

.s.29 USC § 158(a)(5).
1s6
1s7

29 USC § 158(b)(3).
29 USC § 158(d).

"s Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (1947), codified as amended at 29 USC
(2006). The LMRA is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.
19
29 USC § 158(d).
140 Id.
141

§§

151-69

National Labor Relations Board v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation,

356 US 342, 349-50 (1958) (endorsing the "mandatory" and "permissive" categories
created by the NLRB).
142 Id.
143 National Labor Relations Board v Katz,
369 US 736, 742 (1962).
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uniform definition, but one typical definition is the point at
which "whether, in view of all the circumstances of
the bargaining, further discussions would be futile."14 4
Employers and unions can deploy certain economic weapons
only when discussions reach impasse.1 4 5 Importantly, the
employer can unilaterally adopt changes contemplated during
negotiations on mandatory subjects of bargaining only after
reaching impasse.14 6 The union can continue to work without a
contract, and both employer and union can use additional
economic weapons. Ultimately, impasse is not a permanent
solution; the availability of unilateral implementation and
economic weapons on both sides is meant to facilitate
agreement, yet through disruptive means.
B.

Incentives and Impasse in Collective Bargaining

An examination of economic analyses of collective
bargaining is useful in understanding the incentives present for
both employer and union. The duty to bargain, the mandatory
and permissive categories, and the doctrine of impasse are
bargaining rules that apply to both parties. These rules "exist to
restrict the parties' ability to act strategically."1 4 7 Because each
side has economic weapons that can impose costs on the other,
"both sides have an incentive not to behave strategically."1 4 8
Bargaining rules are thus "the keystone of labor laws" and,
coupled with economic weapons, can that lead to "a harmonious
long-term contracting relationship." 149

The impasse doctrine is critical because it eliminates the
incentive for employer abuse. Professor Keith N. Hylton of

144 Gulf States Manufacturing,Inc u National Labor Relations Board, 704 F2d 1390,
1398 (5th Cir 1983).
141 Michael L. Wachter and George M. Cohen, The
Law and Economics of Collective

Bargaining:An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,Partial
Closure, and Relocation, 136 U Pa L Rev 1349, 1372 (1988) (stating that, after reaching
impasse on mandatory bargaining subjects, employers can lock out workers and
employees can strike). The use of other economic weapons during negotiations is entirely
consistent with good faith bargaining. See National Labor Relations Board v Insurance
Agents'InternationalUnion, AFL-CIO, 361 US 477, 490-91 (1960).
146 Insurance Agents'International Union, AFL-CIO, 361 US at 489
("The presence of
economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part
and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.").
147 Wachter and Cohen, 136 U Pa L Rev at 1372 (cited in note 145).
148 Id.
149 Id at 1372-73.
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Boston University School of Law, who conducted an economic
analysis of collective bargaining, succinctly described problems
that arise without a proper impasse doctrine:
If the employer could make an offer that she is sure the
employees would reject and then declare impasse when
the rejection occurred, bargaining law would discourage
honest dealing by the employer. Employers who lied to
their employees would be free to act unilaterally after
declaring impasse, while those who dealt honestly would
find themselves obligated to engage in lengthy
bargaining sessions. The doctrine avoids creating such
incentives by requiring courts to look behind the
employer's declaration that impasse has been reached to
see whether there is evidence that the parties could not
reach agreement after good faith negotiations.15 0
On the union side, incentives for union abuse do not
increase in the absence of an impasse doctrine. Only the
employer can unilaterally act after impasse. Thus the union
would be forced to rely on economic weapons symmetrical to the
employer's-a strike for a lockout, for example-that would
confer no particular advantage to the union. Impasse doctrine is
a critical component in the bargaining scheme that prevents
employers from acting strategically.
C.

Applying the Incentive Analysis of Collective Bargaining to
Conciliation

Applying these concepts to the conciliation process
illustrates why the reasonableness test is best suited to provide
optimal incentives. While the duty to bargain applies to both
employers and unions in the collective bargaining context, the
statutory duty to conciliate implicates only the EEOC.
Employers are not required to participate in conciliation after
the EEOC issues a reasonable cause notice. 15 1 Additionally,

"s Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 Georgetown L J
19, 49 (1994).
...In Fiscal Year 2012, 4,207 reasonable cause determinations were made by the
EEOC. Of those, 37.8 percent (1,591) resulted in successful conciliation and 62.2 percent
(2,616) resulted in unsuccessful conciliation. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Enforcement & Litigation Statistics, online at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/all.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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employers do not have economic weapons to equalize bargaining
power with the EEOC. The EEOC's "weapon" in this context is
the power to institute a federal cause of action against the
employer. The employer has no recourse; if it disagrees with the
EEOC's determination or conciliation efforts, its only recourse is
to respond in the lawsuit brought against it. While the EEOC
lacks the same financial motivation as an employer in the
collective bargaining context, it often imposes significant fines in
conciliation agreements and litigation in a dual effort to provide
remedies for the aggrieved and deter discrimination in other
employers.152 Since employers are not required to negotiate and
do not have tools to effectively negotiate during conciliation, the
EEOC lacks incentive to refrain from acting strategically. While
motives for the EEOC to act strategically could vary widely, the
EEOC might decide, for example, that litigation and the
accompanying publicity would result in a more favorable
outcome.
Additionally, analogizing impasse doctrine to conciliation
also demonstrates why the reasonableness test is preferable to
the deferential standard. The EEOC must attempt to conciliate
before bringing a federal lawsuit against an employer. The point
at which the EEOC deems conciliation a failure can be
considered analogous to impasse in collective bargaining-"that
point at which the parties have exhausted the prospects of
concluding an agreement and further discussions would be
fruitless." 153 Therefore, the good faith standard that minimizes
strategic behavior is most desirable since it will also maximize
the potential for reaching an agreement.
The deferential test would do little to eliminate the EEOC's
incentive for strategic behavior. Judicial review limited to "an
attempt at conciliation" does not alter the incentives during the
conciliation process.154 Applying Professor Hylton's hypothetical
example to conciliation illustrates the point. The EEOC could
make a conciliation offer that it knew would be rejected, declare
conciliation a failure after making one attempt, and unilaterally
bring suit against the employer. This was, in fact, the fact
112 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Strategic
Plan for Fiscal Year
2012 2016, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic-plan_12tol6.cfm (visited
Oct 18, 2014).
..
s Katz, 369 US at 742.
114 KECO Industries, 748 F2d
at 1102.
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pattern of the previously mentioned Ninth Circuit case Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission v Hometown Buffet,
Inc. 15 5 Using the deferential standard, the court upheld the
EEOC's actions.15 6 Using the reasonableness test, a court would
evaluate whether the EEOC "respond[ed] in a reasonable and
flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer."15 7
Considering Professor Hylton's reasoning, the reasonableness
standard would thus avoid creating incentives for insincere
negotiations by looking beyond the EEOC's declaration that
conciliation has failed. Such a check on the EEOC's
determination should not be a difficult bar to surmount and
would help balance the incentives towards voluntary
settlements.
D.

Information Sharing in Collective Bargaining

The role of information sharing in collective bargaining also
supports the argument that it should be a primary focus in the

conciliation process. In National Labor Relations Board v Jacobs
Manufacturing Co, 15 8 an employer refused to share information
proving its claim that it could not afford the union's monetary
demands. 159 The question, according to the court, was whether
the employer must furnish "such statistical and other
information as will substantiate [the employer's] position in
bargaining with the Union." 16 0 The court, in assessing whether
this included the disclosure of pertinent information, held that
Section 8(d) of the NLRA required "cooperation in the give and
take of personal conferences with a willingness to let ultimate
decision follow a fair opportunity for the presentation of
pertinent facts and arguments."161 The court reasoned that "the
bare assertion of a conclusion made upon facts undisclosed and
unavailable to the union . . . was not acceptable without a

presentation of sufficient underlying facts to show, at least, that
the conclusion was reached in good faith." 162
... 481 F Supp 2d 1110 (SD Cal 2007).
11 Id at 1115.

117 Klinger Electric, 636 F2d at 107.
"s 196 F2d 680 (2d Cir 1952).
19 Id at 682.
60 Id at 683.
161 Id.
162 Jacobs Manufacturing Co, 196
F2d at 683.
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The Supreme Court echoed this reasoning in National

Labor Relations Board v Truitt Manufacturing Co.

163

The

employer claimed that a wage increase of ten cents per hour
would "put it out of business," but it refused to provide financial
records to substantiate this claim. 164 The Supreme Court held
that the refusal to provide information, specifically financial
information, could be evidence of bad faith. 165 Reasoning that
"[w]hile Congress did not compel agreement ...

it did require

collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result,"
the Court concluded that "[i]f such an argument is important
enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is
important enough to require some sort of proof of its
accuracy." 166 However, the Court did not make the absence of
disclosure of information a per se violation of good faith
collective bargaining, stating that disclosure is only an element
for consideration on a case-by-case basis. 167 Courts thus believe
that information sharing leads to a greater likelihood of
reaching voluntary agreements in the context of collective
bargaining. In fact, both employers and unions have a duty to
share information in the critical areas of "individual earnings,
job rates and classifications, merit increases, pension data, timestudy data, incentive earnings, piece rates, and the operation of
the incentive system." 168
E.

Information Sharing in Collective Bargaining Applied to
Conciliation

Application of the reasoning behind information sharing in
the collective bargaining context to the conciliation context
provides a persuasive basis to adopt the reasonableness test.
Before explaining information sharing's critical role in
conciliation, it is important to understand just how important
conciliation is to the EEOC. Conciliation is so central to the
EEOC's purpose that it is seen as the primary means of
effectuating the EEOC's goal of eliminating discriminatory
1A
164

351 US 149 (1956).
Id at 150.

16

Id at 152.

166

Id.

167

Truitt ManufacturingCo, 351 US at 153.

16" Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain In Good Faith, 71 Harv L Rev
1401, 1427

(1958).
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practices. 169 Before the EEOC can even file a suit in federal
court, it must attempt conciliation. 170 Courts have consistently
recognized the critical role conciliation plays in the Title VII
framework that Congress enacted. 171 While Congress gave the
EEOC access to federal courts in order to increase its
enforcement ability, federal courts are not the primary tool to
eliminate discriminatory practices.172 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that Title VII aims to keep cases that
can be settled voluntarily out of federal court. 173 Additionally,
even after Title VII was amended in 1972, the conciliation
requirement preceded the ability to bring a cause of action in a
federal court.174 These elements strongly suggest that Congress
intended the conciliation process-voluntary agreements-to
subordinate the remedial nature of Title VII, at least for a
limited period of time.17 5
Given the importance of conciliation to enforcement of Title
VII, courts should adopt standards that maximize the likelihood
See Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36, 44 (1974) (stating that
"[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for
[eliminating discriminatory practices under Title VII]"); OccidentalLife Insurance Co of
California v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 432 US 355, 368 (1977)
(describing the EEOC as "a federal administrative agency charged with the
responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination and settling
disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion").
170 Occidental Life, 432 US at 368 ("[T]he EEOC is required by law to refrain from
commencing a civil action until it has discharged its administrative duties.").
171 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Liberty Trucking Co, 695 F2d
1038, 1042 (7th Cir 1982) ("Even after the 1972 amendments, conciliation remains the
most important function of the EEOC."); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v
Raymond Metal Products Co, 530 F2d 590, 596 (4th Cir 1976) (The commission's
statutory duty to attempt conciliation is among its most essential functions.").
172
General Telephone Company of the Northwest, Inc v Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 446 US 318, 325 (1980) (characterizing the purpose of the 1972
amendments to Title VII as "providing the EEOC with enforcement authority" after it
was unable to secure voluntary compliance).
17 Oscar Mayer & Co v Evans, 441 US 750, 755 (1979), citing 110 Cong Rec 12725
(1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) ("Congress intended through § 706(c) [of the Civil
Rights Act] to screen from the federal courts those problems of civil rights that could be
settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in 'a voluntary and localized manner."').
174 The EEOC cannot initiate a civil action prior to attempting to conciliate. 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(b).
171 One hundred and eighty days after the filing of a claim, if the EEOC has not
initiated an action an individual can request a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC and
sue on their own behalf. 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). This indicates that Congress wanted an
opportunity for the EEOC to investigate and conciliate claims before individuals could
exercise their right to go to federal court. See also Liberty Trucking Co, 695 F2d at 1042
(7th Cir 1982) ("Conciliation is so important to the statutory scheme that the EEOC may
not commence legal action until it has attempted to negotiate voluntary compliance.").
169
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that parties will reach agreements. Remember that in collective
bargaining regarding mandatory subjects, courts have required
information sharing because of the belief that it is necessary for
meaningful negotiations that result in agreements. 176 Courts,
either implicitly or explicitly, look for information sharing in the
conciliation process between the EEOC and employer. When
courts assess the conciliation efforts of the EEOC, they often
look for evidence that the EEOC, at a minimum, informed the
employer of the identity of the discriminated parties, the
discrimination that occurred, and the remedy requested.177 For
employers, courts look for dialogue with the EEOC either
requesting information or providing meaningful counteroffers.1 78
This suggests that courts prioritize information sharing in
conciliation, likely for the same reason that they do so in
collective bargaining-to ensure a dialogue ensues that
maximizes the likelihood of reaching an agreement. Conciliation
should thus prioritize information sharing regarding critical
components of discrimination claims.
Additionally,
the
reasonableness
test
maximizes
information sharing to a greater degree than the deferential
standard. When the employer and EEOC share information, the
chances of reaching agreement are maximized and the potential
for abuse by the EEOC is minimized. Abuse in this context is not
only a court finding of "bad faith" in the EEOC's conciliation
attempts, but a lack of good faith that impedes meaningful
conciliation attempts. When the EEOC lacks good faith attempts
at conciliation, under several standards of review, it is often the
result of the failure to share information about (1) the scope of
the charge,17 9 (2) the size of the potential class affected, 18 0 (3) the
See Truitt ManufacturingCo, 351 US at 152.
See, for example, PrudentialFederal Savings and Loan, 763 F2d at 1169 ("In this
case the EEOC informed Prudential of the identity of the charging parties, the specific
allegations of misconduct, and the remedy sought by each party.").
17s See, for example, Sun Oil, 605 F2d at 1338 (stating that simply
"dismissing the
[EEOC's] statistical analysis as irrelevant and denying without evidence []
discriminatory intent" did not rebut a showing of discrimination or constitute
meaningful conciliation on the employer's part).
179 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v Original
Honeybaked Ham Co of Georgia, Inc, 918 F Supp 2d 1171, 1177-78 (D Colo 2013)
(refusing to extend the scope of harassment and retaliation claims from one supervisor to
eight others because the EEOC is required to "give notice ... of [ ] newly discovered
conduct and provide an opportunity to conciliate").
18o See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v CRST Van
Expedited, Inc, 679 F3d 657, 676 (8th Cir 2012) (holding that the failure of the EEOC to
176
177
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calculation of damages, 18 1 or (4) some combination of the
previous factors.182 The EEOC should share information about
these critical categories with employers while negotiating
voluntary agreements to maximize chances of an agreement.
Using the reasonableness test will incentivize the EEOC to
provide the information to employers more than the deferential
standard. The deferential standard provides little incentive for
the EEOC to provide employers with the information that allows
the formation of meaningful counteroffers because their efforts,
regardless of adequacy, will likely satisfy the test. Consequently,
the EEOC can use the threat of protracted litigation to force
settlement from the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Bloomberg
LP, 18 3 in which the EEOC's initial conciliation agreement
requested more than $24 million to settle a discrimination
claim, illustrates the result of a failure to share information. 184
The employer requested information about the size of the class
and the way damages were determined in order to calculate a
counteroffer. 185 The EEOC refused to provide this information,
and the court stated that this refusal, and the subsequent
termination of conciliation, "reeks of using the proposed
agreement as a weapon to force settlement." 186 Under the
deferential standard, where only an attempt at conciliation is
required by the EEOC, these efforts could be found to be
statutorily sufficient. Remember that in the collective
bargaining context, courts concluded that information sharing
regarding certain mandatory bargaining categories was
conducive to achieving agreements. A similar situation presents
investigate and inform the employer of the potential size of the class indicated a lack of
good faith).
181See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a First Midwest
Bank, NA, 14 F Supp 2d 1028, 1032-33 (ND Ill 1998) (citing the EEOC's failure to
inform the employer how it calculated damages or subsequently quadrupled them in
finding a lack of good faith in EEOC's conciliation attempts).
182

See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Evans Fruit Co,

872 F Supp 1107, 1114 (ED Wash 2012) (holding that good faith conciliation required the
EEOC to be "more forthcoming regarding the type of damages sought ... some
justification for the amount of damages sought, potential size of the class, general
temporal scope of the allegations, and the potential number of individuals . . . alleged to
be involved in the harassment").
1s
751 F Supp 2d 628 (SDNY 2010).
184 Id at
632.
'8

Id at 632-33.

186

Id at 642 (internal citations omitted).
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itself here; by sharing information regarding the scope of the
charge, the size of the class, and calculation of damages,
settlement agreements will materialize at a greater rate and
better promote the elimination of discriminatory practices.
Three important points must be clarified. First, information
sharing should not be measured by the amount of
correspondence exchanged between the EEOC and employer.
Even one correspondence should be sufficient if it contains the
required elements, and this is consistent with good faith in the
duty to collectively bargain as well.187 Second, there are
situations in which the EEOC requests information from the
employer regarding the size of a class of employees or
information to help calculate appropriate damages. Employers
could potentially want clarifying information on what employee
class the EEOC is investigating before taking the time and
associated expense of retrieving the information. Under the
deferential standard, the EEOC could make substantial and
costly information requests of the employer. The reasonableness
standard would require the EEOC to reasonably respond to the
reasonable employer requests clarifying the scope of affected
individuals. 188 Thus even when roles are reversed, the
reasonableness standard is better than the deferential standard
at minimizing the potential for EEOC abuse. Third, courts
should not look at the substance of the EEOC's offer or consider
whether they are fair or reasonable requests. Even in the
collective bargaining context, courts are careful about
scrutinizing the substance of proposals and counterproposals.1 8 9
Looking too closely could affect the actual bargain that
employers and unions would make and is beyond the role of
judicial review. 19 0 Rather, courts assessing the third prong of the
reasonableness test-that the EEOC "responds in a reasonable
and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the

187 American National Insurance Co, 343 US at 404 ("[T]he [NLRA] does not
encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of frank
statement and support of his position.").
188 Unreasonable requests for information would not be found to satisfy the third
prong of the reasonableness standard.
189 See, for example, Zia, 582 F2d at 533.
190 See Hylton, 83 Georgetown L J at 24 n 16 (cited in note 150) ("If the [NLRB]
examines tactics at the bargaining table too closely, then it will eventually find itself
forcing an employer to make concessions to a union that is too weak to gain the
concessions on its own.").

665]

DUTY TO CONCILIATE

695

employer" 191-should examine whether the EEOC has shared
information that allows employers to provide meaningful
counteroffers to the EEOC. This information sharing is
necessarily dependent on what the employer requests and needs
in order to significantly participate in conciliation. 192 If the
employer possesses the necessary information or unreasonably
requests excessive information, then the court should conclude
that the EEOC satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conciliation is the primary method that the EEOC uses to
achieve its goal of eliminating discriminatory practices. The
courts are split as to whether the EEOC's conciliation efforts are
subject to judicial review and, if so, whether the reasonableness
test or the deferential standard is better suited to assess good
faith conciliation. Conciliation should be subject to judicial
review because it is consistent with the statute and better
effectuates the primary goal of Title VII in securing voluntary
agreements.
In addition, the reasonableness test is superior to the
deferential standard. Parties engaged in either collective
bargaining or conciliation share similar incentives to negotiate.
The reasonableness test is superior to the deferential standard
in allocating appropriate incentives to negotiate honestly and
forthrightly. Additionally, the impasse doctrine from collective
bargaining illustrates that the deferential standard incentivizes
the EEOC to act strategically and declare conciliation efforts
futile.
Analysis of information sharing in collective bargaining
confirms that in the conciliation context, information sharing is
also important to reaching voluntary agreements. The

Klinger Electric, 636 F2d at 107.
Compare Bloomberg, LP, 751 F Supp 2d at 641 (concluding that the EEOC failed
the third prong of the reasonableness test because "[t]he EEOC consistently stonewalled
in the face of plainly reasonable requests from Bloomberg to obtain more information
about the claims to formulate a counterproposal") (internal quotations omitted), with
191
192

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission u Hibbing Taconite Co, 266 FRD 260, 274
(D Minn 2009) ("[T]he conciliation requirement does not necessitate that the EEOC
disclose all of the underlying evidence or information to the employer. Rather, the
conciliation process requires that the EEOC provide the employer with sufficient
information to assure that the employer knows the basis of the charge, and is able to
participate in the conciliation process fully.").
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reasonableness standard is best suited to promote information
sharing in conciliation setting. Lastly, information sharing
should focus on the basis for the charge, the size of the potential
class, and the calculation of damages because these areas allow
employers to meaningfully participate in the conciliation
process. By communicating this information, the EEOC can
minimize potential for abuse and maximize the ability to reach
voluntary settlements, thus freeing up additional resources.
Though the EEOC was formed fifty years ago, its goals
remain critical today. Discrimination still exists and the EEOC's
enforcement of Title VII remains one of the most effective tools
in promoting equality in the workplace. With conciliation so
central to the enforcement of Title VII, courts should adopt
standards that will continue to maximize EEOC effectiveness
and minimize discriminatory employment practices. Adopting
the reasonableness standard would protect the benefits that
good faith conciliation is meant to provide.

